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The R:ote of Ideals in Legal Dynamics 
1. introduction 
,!tis almost a platitude to say that we Uve in a highly dynamic world. The introduction of. 
new informationandcommunication technologies and biotechnology and the globalizatton 
bt 'out economies ate just tWo of the inahy factors that lead to rapid changes in our 
modern societies.·Of course, the Jaw tries to keep up with these changes, but often it is 
not very successful. Leglsiative. processes take much time and new statutes are 
soinetrmes already partly outdated at the inomentthey enter into force. The judiciary 
may try to respond to the changes, but usually has limited possibilities. to tic so, 
especially when the social or technological changes are so fundamental as in 'the field 
of,Jor example, the Internet 
The rapid changes thus constitute a challenge to law. How can the law keep up with 
them?.· Are statutory changes. and the gre1dua1 evolution of case law still adequate to 
adapt the law in the books to the reality outside? Or should we perhaps focus on different 
processes of legal change? · 
The rapid changes also present a challenge to lawyers and students of law. How 
can they l<eep up with them? One ofthe obvious responses is an increasing degree of 
specialisation, both In legal practice and in the academic world. By speciallsing, one 
may still hope to coverthe wholefield, even if this is becoming smaller and smaller; but 
speCialisation has its limitations as the various fields of laW influence each other. 
Another response is to revise legal. books more frequently. Law professors still write 
books hi whicn the positive law on· an issue or field~~ systematically presemted, .but tl')e 
revised editions have to follow each other up at increasingly shorter intervals. BuUhis 
attempt to keep up by continuous revisions also has its .limitations. It Is significant that, 
in recent yea,rs, almost all encyclopaedias have abandoned their printed Versions and 
switched to Internet or CD-ROM versions;that can easily he updated. Perhaps itis time 
to abandon the encyclopaedic dream oflegal scholarship too; the dream that a scholar 
can and ~houldmaster all the sources Of law ofacertainfieldand be able to presl:)ntthem 
in a systematic fashion as 'the positive law'; 
Such suggestions almost automatically lead us away from 'law in the books' to its 
traditkma:l companion 'law inw;tlon'. ·Indeed, I believe that, to understand the dynamics 
o.f 'law, we should pay more attention to law as interaction or as a. dimension of 
interaction .2 However, that is not what I want to do today;. I want to focus on law in the 
books and see what sources we may .find there that enable change. 
'Lawln the books' may have tWo different meanings. It may refer to the collection 
of legal texts; statutes, treaties, and case law, and it ma:y refer to the systematic 
presentation of the substantive contents of this collection; for example in a scholarly 
book on Dutch heaJth law. In such a presentation, there is.usually, either implicit or 
explicit, a threefold distinction betWeen the basic prindpl.es, the rules and the specific 
implications for concrete cases. It depends on the (implicit or explicit) philosophical 
inclinations oftheauthor andthe national traditions in this respect, of course, where the · 
emphasis lies,and whetherthere is also any attention to a fourth, even more abstract 
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C:ategory; that of the basic values or ideals behind the principles and rules. We may think 
of collective ideals such as justice, democracy, and the rule of law, but also ofmbre 
individualist ideals such as privacy, or free speech. · 
The thesis I want to de.fend is that, to Understand legal change; wemust focus on 
the most concrete and the most abstract levels, that of the implications for .new cases 
and that ofthe ideals, The first category may seem unproblematic. In the theoretical 
literature of the last decades, it is a recurring theme that application of legal or moral 
rules is not a purely mechanical process, but requires interpretation and thus re-
construction of the meaning of these rules. Each new page that is written in the book of 
Jaw may also change the meaning of the preceding pages; it may even show that the 
preceding pages led. us on the wrong track. When new cases arise, they may challenge 
our current understanding. of law and invite additions. and even revisions tb the set of 
rules and principles. The continuous confrontation ofthe existing legal doctrine with new 
cases may thus give risefo a~tream of usually minor revisions. The empty pages need 
to be filled in. 
The other, abstract category of idears, however; is a much neglected one in legal 
theory.3 Therefore it is time to pay attention to thern. 
2. The Concept of Ideals 
First, What are ideals? I suggest the following stipulative definition: 
Ideals are values that are usually implicit or latent in the Ja·N orthe pUbliC: and moral culture. of a society or 
group, which usually cannot be fully realised and which partly transcend contingent, historical formulations 
and 1mplementations In terms of rules and principles.4 
This definition includes the. main characteristics which account for the role 'ideals 
may play in law. 
First, they are embedded in our social reallty;·they are part of the law. The fact that 
they are not external, but internal means that they are connected to what we already 
accept and already do, and that we can build on that As sources for criticism and 
reinterpretation ofthe law, they are not completely outside the taw; they are part of it. 
Therefore, we can legitimately appeal to them in legal arguments.5 
Second; they can never be completely realised and not even be completely 
formulated. Therefore, they always remain ari inspiring aspiration and a source of 
criticism, challenging us to go beyond what we already realised, beyondwhat is already 
recognised as positive law. Moreover, they.always have a surplus of meaning. Theyare 
like the horizon: once we have reached the point which once seemed to be the horiZon, 
we see new horizons. In new situations, ideals have hitherto unknown and unexplored 
dimensions. Thatiswhy in the sixties, democracy could be i:rsed as an ideal not only for 
3 Th.e most Important exceptions are Lon L. Fuller, Philip Seli:tlick and Ronald Dworkin. It may be 
helpful to phrase my thesis in Dworkin's terms. Dworkin argued that we should distinguish between 
rules and principles, and that acknowledging principles Is not merely introdueing rules manquees, 
but has much wider ramifications because principles.have some essential characieristlcs that make 
them fulfil other roles in legal argument than rules, Ailalogously, I would hcild that, within Dworkin's 
category of principles, we should distinguish between principles and ideals; .and that because ideals 
have some specific characteristics, they can play roles thatprinciples cannot 
4 Cf. my (1997). To the definition in that ariicle I added the word 'usua:l!y', because especially in law, 
for example in preambles to statutes or treaties, ideals are often mentioned expncitly. 
5 This fits In with Michael Walzer's suggestion that, to be an effectiVe critic, one should not be an 
outsider, but should be inside the common practice and appeal to sources wlth.in this practice. 
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the state, but also for companies or schools. It is particularly these characteristics of 
ideals which explain their role in situations of change, as I will show with respect to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
Third and last, they are values. Therefore, they have a normative appeal, they are 
something we should try to realise, and, hence, may be the source of often powerful 
normative arguments. 
This is one of the most problematic characteristics. In my definition, ideals seem a 
distinct subclass of values. But are they really distinct? Can we always replace ideals 
with values? It seems to me that Sanne Taekema made a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of this issue.6 She argues that ideals and values are indeed largely 
replaceable, butthat values mayhave a variable 'ideal' dimension, an ideal dimension 
which consists precisely in characteristics such as that they are not completely 
realisable and cannot be completely formulated. The distinction between ideals and 
other values then becomes not a categorical distinction but a matter of degree. When 
the ideal dimension is paramount, 1t may be useful to call these values ideals. De-
mocracy may thus sometimes be called a value~ when we refer to elements that have 
been realised -and sometimes an ideal~ when we referto elements thathave not (yet) 
been realised and perhaps not even been fully grasped. 
It may be clear why ideals play an important role in processes of change- and not 
only in the context oflaw. As they are always only partly realised and never completely 
formulated, they offer a critical perspective on reality and a source of inspiration for 
moving beyond reality. As our reality always fall short of our ideals, these ideals may 
help us to formulate what it; still wrong with reality. Moreover, they also show us 
directions in which we may try to improve reality. New ideas, new concepts, new 
formulations of our principles and rules may follow from a thorough reflection on the 
meaning of. our ideals. 
Th.is is also true of law. When judges need to reinterpretthe law in order to deal with 
new cases, one of their normative sources within the law are fundamental ideals, such 
as the rule of law or privacy. Confronted with new developments, such as the Internet, 
we may discover new dimensions of those old ideals. I think the development of the 
European Convention on Human Rights presents a clear example ofthis potential for 
change that legal ideals offer. 
3. The European Convention on Human Rights 
Sometimes lawishighlydynamic,usually it is not. One of the clearest examples where 
the dynamic character of the law is explicitly recognised and supported is the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The European Court has explicitly and repeatedly 
declared that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light 
of present-day conditions. 
This implies, for example, that some activity which around 1950 was considered so 
immoral that itsprohibition was necessary in a democratic society, maysome years later 
no. longer be subject to a justified prohibition. The prohibition of homosexuality is an 
example of such a shift, as expressed in the Dudgeon•case:7 
6 Taekema (2002). 
7 Although the early case in which a prohibition of homosexuality was accepted was a Commission 
case (X v Federal Republic of Germany, Appl. 104155, Yearbook I (1955-1957), p. 228 (229), and 
the later cases, starting from Dudgeon, were decided by the Court, it seems no unjustified 
speculation that in the 1950s the Court would also have accepted the prohibition. 
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As compared with the era when that legislation [against homosexual acts- WvdB] was enacted, there is 
now a better understanding, and in consequence an increasecj.tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to the 
extent that in the great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe it is no longer considered 
to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in themselves 
a matterto which the sanctions ofthe criminal law should be applied; the Court cannot overlook the marked 
changes which have occurred in this regard in the domestic law of the member States. a 
This bold dynamic ambition is quite exceptional, especially from a civil law 
perspective. In Dutch law, I can find no parallel. In our civil law tradition, if we feel the 
need for legal change, the first response is to say we need a new statute. And if judicial 
interpretations and legislative modifications have changed the positive law too much, 
a project of recodification seems the natural response. Even in common law traditions, 
the dynamics is usually not sought in an extensive judicial interpretation of statutes or 
other legal texts, but in the continuing judicial reconstruction of the common law.e 
Moreover, it is not merely an ambition, but it seems that the European Court has 
been quite successful in this progressive clarification and implementation of human 
rights. Its case law has indeed evolved in many we,ys and broadened the scope of 
human rights. In many member states, the decisions of the European Court have given 
rise to major legal reforms. It seems to me that one of the secrets of this success is that 
the European Convention is phrased in very broad and vague terms, at the same time 
clearly identifying the fundamental values at stake. Rather than a detailed code of 
regulations, it formulates the basic ideals. 
The important point to notice here is that it does not merely formulate vague norms 
with a very broad open texture. That would not .give much guidance. It expresses the 
basic ideals or values which are both at the core of those norms and at the core of the 
possible exceptions. Each of the human rights refers to a basic and uncontroversial 
ideal; and the exception clauses must be interpreted in the light of the ideal of a 
democratic society. This basic structure of the Convention made it flexible and pro-
gressive. The formulation of ideals- though from a more instrumentalist view looking 
very ineffective because of their vagueness and broadly formulated exceptions- has 
proven to be more effective in the long run. 
It is, however, not only the formulation of the substantive norms which has promoted 
legal development. It is also the discursive structure of the procedures and the explicit 
attempt to formulate convincing arguments based on sound theoretical reflection. An 
example is the old two-stage procedure, where the Commission first, often more frankly, 
formulated the normative issues at hand before the Court dealt with them. It is also 
promoted by the possibility of dissenting and concurring opinions, which more clearly 
identifies the various arguments at stake, and also reduces the need to reach vague 
compromises in the decisions. 
The formulation of ideals in legal instruments is therefore only one of the many 
factors that may promote change. It needs, for example, to be accompanied by 
discursive legal processes and responsive attitudes. This brings me to the second 
theme of this paper. 
8 · European Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon case, Pub!. E.C.H.R., Series A. vol. 45 (1982), par. 60. 
9 The most important exception in the Common Law .tradition is the judicial activism of the US 
Supreme Court. This is clearly not a coincidence, as it has many analogies with the judicial activism 
of the European Court. 
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4. Ideals and Debate 
The secor.d contribution that ideals make to legal change is more indirect: they foster 
open debate which may lead to legal change, through judicial interpretation and 
legislative action, but also by leading to shifting interpretations by society or by specific 
sectors, professions, or semi-autonomous fields in society. The surplus of meaning and 
the fact that they will never be completely realised even ifthey are atleast partly realised 
in law, makes different interpretations posslbleofwhatthese ideals imply for the societal 
problems we are confronted with, and what means wouldbethe best way to realise them 
more fully. 10 
Ideals may provide a common frame of reference, a common starting point in a 
discussion or in a pluralist practice. This insight may also be used in legislative stra-
tegies. In societal fields and practices with great variation and change, such as the 
medical practice, detailed regulation is often impossible and ineffective. In such situa-
tions,legislators may switch from the level of rules and guidelines to the more abstract 
level of principles and ideals. They may choose to lay down these more fundamental 
ideals and principles. This may serve two functions. 11 First, they may express the basic 
commitments oft he political community. And second, theymayserve as common points 
of orientation for a discussion about how to interpret and implement these ideals in 
varying contexts and for the actual implementation. 
For example, if the legislature is confronted with the need for legislation on research 
with human embryos, it may be a good strategy to abstain from detailed regulation. It 
would be better to focus on formulating the basic values or ideals at stake and on 
creating a procedure in which an open discussion is possible on whatthesevalues imply 
for specific research projects.12 
Such a focus on ideals may fit into communicative approaches to legislation, which 
is a core theme of research in our Tilburg research group.13 This newly arising commu-
nicative paradigm comprises, of course, more than just an orientation towards ideals. 
It requires new conceptions of the rule .of law, of deliberative democracy, and of citi· 
zenship.ln turn, developing these conceptions may also require reflection on the basic 
ideals and how these can be reinterpreted in the light of this new communicative 
paradigm. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that, to understand legal change, we should pay more 
attention to ideals. Within legal doctrine, they are an important source for new 
interpretations, for adapting law to changing circumstances and for improving law in light 
of its internal and external aspirations, thus 'working itself pure'. 14 Moreover, their 
openness to varying interpretations also gives them an important role in stimulating 
public discussions both within legal practices in the narrow sense, and in society at 
large. In our highly dynamic society, we can therefore only ignore the importance of 
ideals at our own peril. 
10 1Ne should beware of a simple instrumentalist view of the relation between these ideals and the 
means. Fora good analysis of the dialectic relationship between means and ends, see Westerman 
(1999). 
11 See Van der Burg and Brom (2000); and my (2001 ). 
12 Cf. my (1996). 
:3 Cf. Van Klink andWitteveen (2000). 
14 Cf. Ronald Dworkin's analysis of this idea In (1986). 
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